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Abstract. 1 Game Theory studies situations in which multiple agents having
conflicting objectives have to reach a collective decision. The question of a com-
pact representation language for agents utility function is of crucial importance
since the classical representation of a n-players game is given by a n-dimensional
matrix of exponential size for each player. In this paper we use the framework of
Constraint Games in which CSP are used to represent utilities. Constraint Pro-
gramming –including global constraints– allows to easily give a compact and
elegant model to many useful games. Constraint Games come in two flavors:
Constraint Satisfaction Games and Constraint Optimization Games, the first one
using satisfaction to define boolean utilities. In addition to multimatrix games, it
is also possible to model more complex games where hard constraints forbid cer-
tain situations. In this paper we study complete search techniques and show that
our solver using the compact representation of Constraint Games is faster than
the classical game solver Gambit by one to two orders of magnitude.
1 Introduction
Game theory has proven to be highly successful in modeling interaction of selfish agents
[21,20]. In a strategic game, each player is given a set of actions and has to choose
one to perform. A reward is given to a player by an utility function which depends
on the actions taken by all players. One of the best known solution concepts for this
type of game is the pure Nash equilibrium (PNE), which occur when no player is able
to improve her utility by changing her chosen action to another one. There are many
ways do define solution concepts [24] but PNE has the notable advantage of giving a
deterministic decision for the players. Indeed, PNE for games are similar to solutions for
CSP: not all games own a PNE, and when available, some PNE may be more desirable
than others. They are nevertheless a basic tool to study games.
The basic representation of games is a multimatrix called normal form whose size is
exponential in the number of players. The intractability of this representation is a severe
limitation to the widespead of game-based modeling. This key issue has been adressed
by several types of compact representations. Some are based on some assumptions on
the interactions between players, like graphical games [18] or action-graph games [17]
while other are language-based, like Boolean Games [14,9,4] or Constraint Games [22].
We focus our interest here in Constraint Games for which utilities are expressed by
Constraint Satisfaction Problems (CSP) or Constraint Optimization Problems (COP).
1 This work is supported by Microsoft Research grant MRL-2011-046.
ar
X
iv
:1
40
4.
45
02
v2
  [
cs
.G
T]
  2
9 A
pr
 20
14
2Constraint Games provide a rich modeling language which allows a natural formulation
of the players goals. In particular, it allows to express in a compact way most classical
games like congestion games [26], network games [6], strategic scheduling [28], to
name a few. In addition, hard constraints [25] can be provided to limit the joint strategies
all players may take. This allow unrealistic equilibria to be ruled out. Note that these
constraints are global to all players, unlike the local constraints defined in [3], and they
provide crucial expressivity in modeling.
Despite the high modeling interest of games to model strategic interaction, it is still
difficult to find a PNE game solver. The normal form game solver Gambit [19] is cur-
rently considered as state-of-the-art. Also non-compact logic transformations have been
studied [8,12]. For Boolean Games, there are techniques limited to specific categories
of games like games with acyclic interaction graph [2] or using specific bargaining
techniques [10]. For Constraint Games, only a solver based on local search has been
proposed [22]. Not surprisingly, large games can be solved but with no guarantee of
finding an equilibrium or prove the absence of equilibrium. This is due for a large part
to the high complexity of finding a PNE [13,4].
Few other works are related to Games and Constraint Programming. In [5], it has been
proposed to compute a mixed equilibrium using continuous constraints. Some other
formalism try to solve a combinatorial problem by multiple agents, either with a prede-
fined assignment of variables to agents like in DCOP [11] or by letting the agents select
dynamically their variable like in SAT-Games [29] and Adversarial CSP [7].
In this paper, we prove that Constraint Games are Σp2 -complete like Boolean Games
and then we focus on the problem of finding all PNE for a Constraint Game. Although
finding one PNE is a very interesting problem in itself, finding all of them allows more
freedom for choosing equilibria that fulfill some additional requirements. For example
the correctness of the computation of Pareto Nash equilibria rely on the completeness
of PNE enumeration. We present in this paper ConGa, a new correct and complete
solver for Constraint Games. This solver is based on a fast computation of equilibrium
condition we call Nash consistency and a pruning algorithm for never best responses.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on publicly available benchmarks
from the Gamut suite [23] as well as on real-life applications.
2 Constraint Games
Let V be a set of variables and D = (Dx)x∈V be the family of their (finite) domains.
ForW ⊆ V , we denote byDW the set of tuples onW , namelyΠx∈WDx. Projection of
a tuple (or a set of tuples) on a variable (or a set of variables) is denoted by |: for t ∈ DV ,
t|x = tx, t|W = (tx)x∈W and for E ⊆ DV , E|W = {t|W | t ∈ E}. ForW,U ⊆ V , the
join ofA ⊆ DW andB ⊆ DU isA 1 B = {t ∈ DW∪U | t|W ∈ A ∧ t|U ∈ B}. When
W ∩ U = ∅, we denote the join of tuples t ∈ DW and u ∈ DU by (t, u). A constraint
c = (W,T ) is a couple composed of a subset W = var(c) ⊆ V of variables and a
relation T = sol(c) ⊆ DW (called solutions). A Constraint Satisfaction Problem (or
CSP) is a set of constraints. We denote by sol(C) = 1c∈C sol(c) its set of solutions. To
simplify the exposition, we identify sol(C) with its cylindric extension to all variables
of V (i.e. with any combination of values for the variables which do not belong to C).
3Let P be a set of n players and V a finite set of variables. The set of variables is
partitioned into controlled variables Vc =
⋃
i∈P Vi where Vi is the subset of variables
controlled by Player i, and VE the set of uncontrolled or existential variables (VE =
V \ Vc).
Definition 1 (Constraint Satisfaction Game). A Constraint Satisfaction Game (or
CSG) is a 4-tuple (P, V,D,G) where P is a finite set of players, V is a finite set of
variables composed of a family of disjoint sets (Vi) for each player i ∈ P and a set
VE of existential variables disjoint of all the players variables, D = (DX)X∈V is the
family of their domains and G = (Gi)i∈P is a family of CSP on V .
The CSP Gi is called the goal of the player i. The intuition behind CSG is that, while
Player i can only control her own subset of variables Vi, her satisfaction will depend
also on variables controlled by all the other players. The intuition behind existential
variables is that they are existentially quantified (but most of the time they will be
functionally defined from decision variables). A strategy for player i is an assignment
of the variables Vi controlled by player i. A strategy profile s = (si)i∈P is the given of
a strategy for each player.
Definition 2 (Winning strategy). A strategy profile s is winning for i if it satisfies the
goal of i: s ∈ sol(Gi).
A CSG can be interpreted as a classical game with a boolean payoff function which
takes value 1 when the player’s CSP is satisfied and 0 when not.
We denote by s−i the projection of s on V−i = V \Vi. Given a strategy profile s, a player
i has a beneficial deviation if s 6∈ sol(Gi) and ∃s′i ∈ DVi such that (s′i, s−i) ∈ sol(Gi).
Beneficial deviation represents the fact that a player will try to maximize her satisfaction
by changing the assignment of the variables she can control if she is unsatisfied by the
current assignment. A tuple s is best response for Player i if this player is not able to
make any beneficial deviation. Then we define the notion of solution of a CSG by pure
Nash equilibrium:
Definition 3 (Pure Nash Equilibrium). A strategy profile s is a Pure Nash Equilib-
rium (or PNE) of the CSG C if and only if no player has a beneficial deviation, i.e. s is
best response of all players.
Theorem 1. CSG are Σp2 -complete.
Proof. The proof is adapted from the Σp2 -completeness of boolean games [4].
Membership comes from the simple algorithm in which one guesses a strategy pro-
file and checks that no player has a beneficial deviation. Each verification consists in
proving that a player i has no solution if the strategy profile is not winning for i. This
verification is in coNP because for a strategy profile s, proving that there exists a so-
lution for Player i amounts to solve the CSP Gi, which is in NP. Since the number of
players is finite, there is a polynomial number of calls to a coNP oracle (actually one
for each player) and thus the problem is in Σp2 .
For hardness, we introduce a special case of CSG: the 2-players 0-sum game. In this
kind of game, when one player wins, the other player looses. Thus it is enough to
represent only the goal of the first player, the other one being deduced by negation.
4Such a CSG can be represented by (P = {1, 2}, V,D,C) where C is the goal of player
1 (the goal of Player 2 is straightforwardly deduced by negation).
We perform a reduction from a ∃∀-QCSP to a 2-players 0-sum CSG. ∃∀-QCSP are
known to be Σp2 -complete. This reduction proves that even 2-players 0-sum CSG are
at least as hard than solving a ∃∀-QCSP. Together with membership of the Σp2 class, it
gives the exact complexity for n-players CSG.
The reduction is from the QCSP Q = ∃X∀Y C where X and Y are disjoint sets of
variables to the 2-players 0-sum CSG G = ({1, 2}, X ∪ Y ∪ {x, y}, (D,Dx, Dy), C ∨
(x = y)) where x is a new variable controlled by player 1, y a new variable controlled
by player 2 and Dx = Dy are domains composed at least of 2 elements. It is obvious
that the conversion can be performed in polynomial time. IfQ is valid, then let s1 be the
assignment of variables of X and let s2 be an assignment of variables of Y . Because
Q is valid, ∀s′2 ∈ DY , (s1, s′2) ∈ sol(C). Thus (s1, s2) is a PNE because player
1 is winning and player 2 has no beneficial deviation. Conversely, if Q is not valid
then for any assignment s1 ∈ DX of player 1, player 2 can play s′2 ∈ DY such that
(s1, s
′
2) 6∈ sol(C). Then if player 1 plays x = v and if (s1, s2) ∈ sol(C), then player
2 can play s′2 and y = w with w 6= v. Thus player 2 has a beneficial deviation and
(s1, s2, v, w) is not an equilibrium. If (s1, s2) 6∈ sol(C) and player 2 plays y = w, then
player 1 can play x = w and player 1 has a beneficial deviation. Thus (s1, s2, w, w) is
not an equilibrium. In conclusion, G has a PNE if and only if Q is valid, proving the
Σp2 -hardness. 2
The players goals could be considered as soft constraints or preferences. It may happen
however some games have rules that forbid some strategy profiles as they model impos-
sible situations. It is natural to reject such profiles by setting hard constraints shared by
all players [25]. Hard constraints can be easily expressed in the framework of Constraint
Games by adding an additional CSP on the whole set of variables in order to constrain
the set of possible strategy profiles:
Definition 4 (CSG with Hard Constraints). A Constraint Satisfaction Game with
Hard Constraints (or CSG-HC) is a 5-tuple (P, V,D,C,G) where (P, V,D,G) is a
CSG and C is a CSP on V .
It is useful to distinguish a strategy profile which does not satisfy any player’s goal from
a strategy profile which does not satisfy the hard constraints. The former can be a PNE
if no player has a beneficial deviation while the latter cannot. Therefore hard constraints
provide an increase of modelling expressibility (without however changing the general
complexity of CSG).
By adding an optimization condition it is possible to represent classical games. A Con-
straint Optimization Game (or COG) is an extension of CSG in which each player tries
to optimize her goal. This is achieved by adding for each player i an optimization con-
dition min(x) or max(x) where x ∈ V is a variable to be optimized by Player i.
Definition 5 (Constraint Optimization Game). A Constraint Optimization Game
(or COG) is a 5-tuple (P, V,D,G, opt) where (P, V,D,G) is a CSG and opt =
(opti)i∈P is a family of optimization conditions for each player of the form min(x)
or max(x) where x ∈ V .
5A winning strategy for player i is still a strategy profile which satisfies Gi. However,
the notion of beneficial deviation needs to be slightly adapted. We denote by <opti the
(partial) order on strategy profiles such that s <opti s
′ if s−i = s′−i and s|x < s′|x
when opti = min(x) (resp. s|x > s′|x when opti = max(x)). Given a strategy profile
s, a player i has a beneficial deviation if ∃s′i ∈ DVi such that s′ = (s′i, s−i) ∈ sol(Gi)
and s′ <opti s. Given this, the notion of solution is the same as for CSG. In addition,
COG can be extended with hard constraints the same way CSG are, yielding COG-HC.
3 Modeling with Constraint Games
In this section, we show that complex games can be easily expressed using constraint
games.
Example 1 (Location Game). In this example inspired by [15], n ice cream vendors
from a set P = {1, 2, .., n} want to choose a location numbered from 1 to m for their
stand in a street. Each seller i wants to find a location li. She already has fixed the
price of her ice cream to pi and we assume there is a customer’s house at each location.
No two vendors may choose the same location. The customers choose their vendor by
minimizing the sum of the distance between their house and the seller plus the price of
the ice cream.
A possible situation for 3 sellers and 14 customers is depicted in Figure 1. The strategy
profile depicted at the top of the figure is not an equilibrium since the left player can
deviate and “steal” a customer to the middle player by shifting two positions on the
right.
Fig. 1: Location game. Arrows depict the behavior of customers, triangles represent ice
cream vendors with their selling price. In the first situation on top, Player 1 can improve
benefits by shifting two places to the right, giving situation 2 at bottom.
In order to build the model, we need the following existential variables (which are
functionally determined by the decision variables li):
– costic: defines the cost customer c has to pay if she chooses the stand of seller i.
– minc: defines the minimal cost customer c has to pay for an ice cream.
– choiceic: boolean variable which is 1 if customer c chooses seller i.
6– benefiti: defines the number of customers actually buying from seller i.
The Location Game (LG) can be easily modelled by a COG-HC in which each seller
wants to maximize her profit:
– P = {1, . . . , n}
– ∀i ∈ P, Vi = {li}
– ∀i ∈ P, D(li) = {1, . . . ,m}
– the hard constraints C are the following:
• no two vendors are located at the same place: all different(l1, l2, . . . , ln)
• ∀i ∈ P,∀c ∈ [1..m], costic = |c− li|+ pi
• ∀c ∈ [1..m], minc = min(cost1c, . . . ,costnc)
• ∀c ∈ [1..m], (minc =costic) ← (choiceic = 1). Because it may happen that
a customer gets the same price from two sellers, we simply enforce one side
implication. Then the sum constraint on choices ensures that a customer only
visits one seller.
• ∀c ∈ [1..m],∑i∈Pchoiceic = 1
– ∀i ∈ P , Gi contains the following constraint: benefiti = pi.
∑
c∈[1..m]choiceic
– ∀i ∈ P , the optimization condition Opti = max(benefiti)
An interesting feature of this example is that it uses global constraints like all different
the same way as in Constraint Programming. It also show the interest of modeling hard
constraints in games since it is perfectly natural to think that no two vendors can settle
at the same place. It is possible to transform this problem into a CSG by fixing a min-
imal profit mpi for each player i and stating that player i is satisfied if her benefits is
over mpi. It can be done by adding the constraint benefiti ≥ mpi to Gi instead of the
optimization condition. In the Gamut [23] version of the game, vendors do not choose
location but prices, because there is no way to express that sellers should choose differ-
ent locations in a normal form game like we do here with the all different constraint.
Example 2 (Cloud Resource Allocation Game). Resource allocation is a central issue in
cloud computing where clients use and pay computing resources on demand. In order
to manage conflicting interests between clients, [16] has proposed the framework of
CRAG (Cloud Resource Allocation Game) in which resource assignments are defined
by game equilibrium.
A cloud computing provider owns a set M = {M1, . . . ,Mm} of m machines, each
machine Mj having a capacity cj representing the amount of resource available (for
example CPU-hour, memory). The cost of using machine j is given by lj(x) = x× uj
where x is the number of resources requested and uj some unit cost. A set of n clients
P = {1, 2, .., n}wants to use simultaneously the cloud in order to perform tasks. Client
i ∈ P has mi tasks {Ti1, ..., Timi} to perform, with respective requested capacity of
{di1, ..., dimi}. Each client i ∈ P chooses selfishly an allocation rik for the task Tik
(k ∈ 1..mi) and wishes to minimize her cost costi =
∑
k=1..mi
lrik(dik). We assume
that the provider’s resources amount is sufficient to accommodate the requests of all the
clients:
∑
i∈[1..n]
∑
k∈[1..mi] dik ≤
∑
j∈[1,..m] cj . This problem can be modelled by the
following COG-HC:
– P = {1, .., n}
7– ∀i ∈ P, Vi = {ri1, ..., rimi}
– ∀i ∈ P,∀k ∈ [1, ...,mi], D(rik) = {1, . . . ,m}
– C is composed of the following constraints:
• channelling constraints for boolean variables stating that machine j is requested
by task tik: (rik = j)↔ (choiceijk = 1)
• capacity constraints: ∀j ∈ [1, ..,m],∑i∈[1..n]∑k∈[1..mi] choiceijk×dik ≤ cj
– ∀i ∈ P, Gi is composed of the following constraint:
costi =
∑
j=1..m
∑
k=1..mi
choiceijk × lj(dik)
– ∀i ∈ P, Opti = Minimize (costi)
Other interesting examples can be modeled by Constraint Games like network game
[6], strategic scheduling [28], or games from the Gamut suite [23].
4 Pruning techniques
A natural algorithm is to use generate and test to find an equilibrium. This naive algo-
rithm is however the only known algorithm for finding PNE [27] and from the complex-
ity result, it is unlikely that any fast (polynomial) algorithm could exist. This algorithm
is therefore the basis of the implementation of the Gambit solver [19] for PNE enu-
meration. We first show that this technique is subject to a form of trashing. In order to
simplify the exposition, we assume in the remaining of the paper that each player i only
controls one variable xi with domain Di. The extension to more than one variable per
player is not difficult (indeed our solver Conga does not have this limitation since many
examples require a player to control several variables).
The enum1 algorithm (Algorithm 1) consists in enumerating all strategy profiles, testing
each of them for each player for deviation and skipping to the next profile when the first
deviation is found.
The following example shows that some deviations are performed several times.
Example 3. Let G be the 2-players game defined by the following table:
y
1 2 3
x
a (0,1)α (1,0) (1,0)
b (0,1)β (0,0) (1,0)
c (1,0) (1,1) (0,0)
We assume that the enumeration starts by Player x. The first tuple to be enumerated is
(a, 1) denoted by α. Deviation is checked for Player y and no deviation is found. Then
deviation is checked for Player x and a deviation towards (c, 1) is found. Thus this tuple
is not a PNE. The next candidate is (b, 1) denoted by β. This tuple is checked for Player
y and again no deviation is found. But when checked for Player x, the same deviation
towards (c, 1) is found as for tuple α.
8Algorithm 1 enum1
1: function ENUM1(Game CG): setof tuples
2: Nash← ∅
3: for s ∈ DVc do
4: if IsNash(s) then
5: Nash = Nash ∪ {s}
6: end if
7: end for
8: return Nash
9: end function
10: function ISNASH(tuple s): boolean
11: for i ∈ P do
12: for v ∈ Di, v 6= si do
13: if (s−i, v) <opti s then
14: return false
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: return true
19: end function
This form of trashing is a strong motivation to investigate search and pruning tech-
niques for Constraint Games. To introduce our technique, we first recall [13] where the
authors introduce (originally for graphical games) a CSP composed of Nash constraints
to represent best responses for each player.
Definition 6 (GGS-CSP). Let CG = (P, V,D,G, opt) be a COG. The Nash con-
straint of player i ∈ P is gi = (Vc, T ) where T = {t ∈ DV | 6∃t′ ∈ DV s.t. t′ <opti t}.
The GGS-CSP G(CG) of CG is the set of Nash constraints for all players.
This CSP has the important property that it defines the PNE of the game:
Theorem 2. ([13]) t is a PNE of CG↔ t ∈ sol(G(CG))
Then it follows that a PNE of a Constraint Game CG has a support in all of its Nash
constraints.
Our technique consists to perform a traversal of the search space by assigning the vari-
ables of each player in turn according to a predefined ordering on P . For each candidate
tuple, we seek for supports by performing an incremental computation of the Nash con-
straints. Each computed deviation is recorded in a table for each player. By retrieving
tuples in Nash constraints, we can avoid computing costly deviations.
However, since we are studying general games, each Nash constraint has the same arity
as the whole problem, which is challenging in terms of space requirements. First, note
that any tuple deleted from a table does not hinder the correctness of the Nash test. It
may only forces a deviation to be computed twice. Hence we are free to limit the size
of the tables and trade space with time. In practice, two features limit the size of the
tables.
9First, deviation checks are performed in reverse player ordering. It means that a tuple
checked for the first player must have succeed the deviation test for all other players.
In practice for most problems, this limits the number of tuples reaching the upper lev-
els. Second, we can delete a tuple t recorded in a table when we can ensure that no
candidate t′ will deviate anymore towards t. This property is given by the following in-
dependence of subgames theorem. Let CG = (P, V,D,G, opt) be a constraint game.
A game CG′ = (P, V,D′, G, opt) is a subgame of CG if ∃i ∈ P, D′i ⊆ Di and
i 6= j → D′j = Dj . We denote by bri(t) = {t′ ∈ sol(Gi) | t′−i = t−i} the set of best
response strategies from t for Player i.
Fig. 2: Independence of subgames
Proposition 1. Let CG be a constraint game and CG′ a subgame of CG such that
D′i ⊆ Di. Let D′′ = D \ D′, t′ ∈ D′V and t′′ ∈ D′′V . Then ∀j ∈ P, j 6= i →
brj(t
′) ∩ brj(t′′) = ∅.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there exists t′ ∈ D′V and t′′ ∈ D′′V
such that brj(t′) ∩ brj(t′′) 6= ∅. Let s ∈ brj(t′) ∩ brj(t′′). Then since s ∈ brj(t′),
si ∈ D′Vi . Since s ∈ brj(t′′), si ∈ D′′Vi . Hence the contradiction. 2
This proposition is illustrated in Figure 2: if we split the search space following Player
Z, best responses for Players X and Y are forced to remain in different subspaces.
By applying inductively Proposition 1 on a sequence of assignments of strategies for
Player 1 to k with k < n, we see that two branches of the search tree will not share best
responses for the remaining unassigned players. Hence we can freely remove all tuples
from the table of subsequent players once the branch is explored.
The last optimization consists in elimination of never best responses (NBR).
Definition 7. A strategy si for Player i is a never best response if ∀t−i,∃s′i such that
(s′i, t−i) <opti (si, t−i).
Iterative elimination of NBR is a sound pruning for games [1] which additionally is
stronger than elimination of strongly dominated strategies. But unfortunately their de-
tection is very costly in the n-players case since it needs to know that this action will
never been chosen by Player i for all strategy profiles of the other players. However,
being a NBR in a subgame is a sufficient condition for not being an equilibrium:
10
Proposition 2. Let CG be a constraint game and CG′ a subgame of CG such that
D′i ⊆ Di. Let sj ∈ D′j be a NBR in CG′ with j 6= i. Then for all s−j , if s = (sj , s−j)
is a PNE, then si 6∈ D′i.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there exists a PNE s = (sj , s−j) with
(s−j)i ∈ D′i. Because s is a PNE, we have ∀k ∈ P, sk ∈ br(s)|k. Then because
sj is a NBR for j in CG′, there exists s′j such that (s
′
j , s−j) <optj (sj , s−j). Thus
sj 6∈ br(s)|j . 2
By applying inductively Proposition 2 on a sequence of assignments of strategies for
Player 1 to k with k < n, we see that if we detect that a value v is NBR for player k in
the subgame defined by the sequence of assignments, then this value will not participate
to a PNE and we can prune it.
5 An algorithm for Nash equilibria enumeration
Algorithm 2 ConGa
1: global:
2: BR: array[1..n] of tuples . best responses for all players
3: cnt: array[1..n] of integer . counters for NBR detection
4: Nash: set of tuples . Nash equilibria
5: S: global solver
6: function CONGA(Game CG): setof tuples
7: Nash← ∅
8: Initialize solver S with hard constraints
9: A←D
10: enum(A, 1)
11: return Nash
12: end function
We propose a tree-search algorithm for finding all PNE. The general method is based
on three ideas:
– all candidates (except those which are detected as NBR) are generated in lexico-
graphic order;
– undominated solutions for each player are recorded in a table;
– whenever a domination check is performed, it first checks this player’s recorded
best responses.
We assume given an ordering on players from 1 to n. The main algorithm (Algorithm
2) launches the recursive traversal (Algorithm 3) starting by Player 1. We distinguish
the original domains of the variables (called D) used to compute deviations from their
11
actual domain explored by the search tree (called A) and subject to pruning by arc-
consistency on hard constraints.
Propagation of hard constraints allows to ensure that no forbidden tuple will be ex-
plored. If the propagation returns false, then at least one domain has been wiped out
and there is no solution in this subspace. Otherwise domains A are reduced according
to arc-consistency. Values for each player are then recursively enumerated. When a tu-
ple is reached, it is checked for Nash condition (line 5) by Algorithm 4. Otherwise,
at least one domain remains to be explored. Each player i owns a table BR[i] of best
responses, initialized empty and a counter cnt[i] initialized with the size of the sub-
space needed to detect potential never best responses. For the sake of efficiency, the
table BR[i] is actually implemented by a search tree. Hence insertion and search are
done in O(|P|). After the recursive call of enum, we test whether all the subspace af-
ter Player i has been checked for deviation. Then all subsequent values are never best
responses. In this case an exit from the loop causes backjumping to the ancestor node.
This backjumping is done after the exploration by checkEndOfTable (Algorithm 6) of
the potential values which are stored in the table and belong to the unexplored space
(lines 14-17).
Algorithm 3 enum
1: procedure ENUM(domains A, int i)
2: status← S.propagate(A)
3: if status then
4: if i > n then
5: checkNash(tuple(A),n)
6: else
7: BR[i]← ∅
8: cnt[i]←Πj>i|Dj |
9: while Ai 6= ∅ do
10: choose v ∈ Ai
11: B← A
12: enum((B−i, (Bi = {v})), i+ 1)
13: Ai← Ai − {v}
14: if cnt[i] ≤ 0 then
15: checkEndOfTable(A, i)
16: break
17: end if
18: end while
19: end if
20: end if
21: end procedure
The checkNash procedure in Algorithm 4 verify whether a player can make a beneficial
deviation from a tuple. Since the exploration of the search tree is done level by level,
the verification starts from the deepest level. First the tuple is searched in the table of
12
stored best response for this player (line 5). If not found, a solver for Gi is called in
function deviation depicted in Algorithm 5 (line 7). This function returns the set d of
deviations for Player i from a tuple t. There can be more than one deviation. In a CSG,
it means that several assignments satisfy the constraints of Gi. In a COG, it means that
the optimal value is reached for more than one point. If d is empty, it means that there
is no possible action for Player i which can satisfy the constraints of her goal. Indeed, a
tuple can be an equilibrium even if a (or all) player is unsatisfied. In this case we return
the whole initial domain as deviation: any value can participate to a PNE because the
player has no preference.
Algorithm 4 checkNash
1: procedure CHECKNASH(tuple t, int i)
2: if i = 0 then
3: Nash← Nash ∪ {t}
4: else
5: d← search table(t, BR, i)
6: if d = ∅ then
7: d← deviation(t, i)
8: if d = ∅ then
9: d←Di
10: end if
11: insert table(i, BR, d)
12: cnt[i] - -
13: end if
14: if ti ∈ d then
15: checkNash(t, i− 1)
16: end if
17: end if
18: end procedure
Algorithm 5 deviation
1: function DEVIATION(tuple t, int i): set of integer
2: d← ∅
3: Initialize solver Si with Gi (and opti for a COG)
4: add constraints xj = tj for all j 6= i
5: sol← Si.getSolution()
6: while sol 6= nil do
7: d← d ∪ {sol}
8: sol← Si.getSolution()
9: end while
10: return d
11: end function
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Algorithm 6 checkEndOfTable
1: procedure CHECKENDOFTABLE(domain A, int i)
2: for all t ∈ BR[i] such that t ∈ Πi=1..nAi do
3: checkNash(t, n)
4: end for
5: end procedure
The procedure checkEndOfTable depicted in Algorithm 6 is used when the subspace
has been explored and just before performing backjumping. In this case, all tuples of
the table which belong to the unexplored zone are checked for PNE. An example of
backjumping is given in Figure 3.
Fig. 3: Online detection of never best responses
In this example, the domains of player Y and Z are respectively of size 9 and 3. Hence
cnt[Y ] is initialized to 3. All tested tuples are of the form 1yz where 1 is the value on
X . If we suppose that tuples 113, 121, 133 and 142 are stable for Z, these tuples are
lifted to Y level to be checked for Y ’s deviation. Solid arrows depict the deviations
recorded for Player Y . It happens in this example that only by exploring values 1, 2, 3
and 4 for Y yield a complete traversal of the subspace defined by Z (all values from Z’s
domain have been considered). Thus after the exploration of Y = 4, we know that only
182 recorded in Y ’s table can be a PNE with X = 1. The other values of Player Y are
NBR. It is sufficient to check this tuple by checkEndOfTable and we can backtrack to
the next value of Player X (dotted arrows). In general checkEndOfTable tests all tuples
of BR[Y ] which belong to the unexplored part of the search space. This NBR detection
is incomplete but comes almost for free because it only takes a counter. Note that by
Proposition 1, when exploring X = 2, the table for Y can be reset because no other
tuple will deviate to a tuple where X = 1.
We propose to follow the Conga algorithm on the small example depicted on Figure 4.
The resolution starts in Figure 4.a (abbreviated 4.a) with tuple 111. This tuple is checked
for deviation for Z and deviates, say, to Z = 3 as shown in 4.b, storing 113 in Z’s table.
Since the possible deviations for Z are explored, we jump by checkEndOfTable to 113
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Fig. 4: Conga algorithm
as in 4.c. This tuple is obviously a Nash candidate for Z, and is checked for deviation
for the other players in reverse order. It is thus checked for Y in 4.d and, in our exam-
ple, is found stable for Y , storing 113 in Y ’s table. Then the tuple is checked for X in
4.e and a deviation to 213 is found, which causes 213 to be stored in X’s table. Then
backtracking occurs in 4.f at Y ’s level, which resets the table for Z. The next candidate
is 121. In 4.g, a deviation is found for Z to 123, in 4.h, the tuple 123 is considered, and
checked for deviation for Y in 4.i. But it is no use to perform a real deviation check
because the value 113 is found in Y ’s table, meaning that a best response with Y = 1
has been recorded for X = 1, Z = 3 and is thus a deviation for 123. Backtracking at
X’s level occurs and the tables for Z and Y are emptied (4.j). Note that the tables for
Player i are actually implemented by a tree whose nodes represent all players but i, with
i’s best responses attached on the leaves. Thus the search for deviation in the table does
not depend on the number of recorded tuples but only on the number of players and is
performed in O(|P|).
Proposition 3. ConGa is correct and complete.
Proof. Correctness comes from the correctness of PNE check (theorem 2). A reported
PNE has been checked for deviation for every player. Either the tuple has been recorded
in the table as deviation from another one, or had been directly checked by the solver
against the player’s goal. Completeness is due to the traversal of the whole search space
and soundness of never best response pruning. 2
6 Experiments
We have performed experiments on classical games of the Gamut suite [23] and some
games with hard constraints. Results are summarized in Table 1 in which the name of
the game is followed by the number of players and the size of the domain. Gamut games
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are CG (Congestion Game), GTTA (Guess Two Third Average), LG(GV) (Location
Game, Gamut version), MEG (Minimum Effort Game) and TD (Traveller’s Dilemma).
Their description can be found in [23]. The other games are LG(HC) (Location Game
with Hard Constraints, example 1) and CRAG (Cloud Resource Allocation Game, ex-
ample 2).
Name NF gen Gambit enum1 ConGa #PNE
Time Size Time Time #Cand #Dev Time #Cand #Dev
CG.7.15 253 5.1 MO 70 1.7E+8 1.8E+8 27 2.1E+7 1.3E+7 630
CG.8.15 4613 89 MO 1019 2.5E+9 2.7E+9 371 3.1E+8 1.9E+8 1680
CG.9.15 TO – – 17361 3.8E+10 4.2E+10 5880 4.9E+9 2.9E+9 5040
GTTA.3.100 1 0.1 17 4 1.0E+6 1.3E+6 0 1.0E+4 1.0E+4 1
GTTA.4.100 113 1.7 1844 312 1.0E+8 1.3E+8 10 1.0E+6 1.0E+6 1
GTTA.5.100 TO 205 MO 4032 1.0E+10 1.3E+10 778 1.0E+8 1.0E+8 1
LG(GV).2.1000 1 0.01 134 339 1.0E+6 1.0E+6 6 2.0E+3 1.5E+3 0
LG(GV).2.2000 6 0.04 655 1441 4.0E+6 4.0E+6 31 4.0E+3 3.5E+3 0
LG(GV).2.3500 17 0.1 5337 6789 1.2E+7 1.2E+7 93 7.0E+3 6.0E+3 0
LG(GV).2.5000 34 0.2 7786 20000 2.5E+7 2.5E+7 201 1.0E+4 9.0E+3 0
LG(GV).2.20000 552 3.7 MO TO – – 3578 4.0E+4 3.9E+5 0
MEG.3.100 1 0.1 13 0 1.0E+6 1.0E+6 0 1.9E+4 1.5E+4 100
MEG.4.100 91 1.9 1555 28 1.0E+8 1.0E+8 6 1.9E+6 1.3E+6 100
MEG.5.100 TO 241 MO 2082 1.0E+10 1.0E+10 403 1.9E+8 1.2E+8 100
MEG.30.2 8784 91 MO 423 1.1E+9 2.1E+9 503 5.4E+8 1.1E+9 2
MEG.35.2 TO – – 15933 3.4E+10 6.9E+10 TO – – 2
TD.3.99 3 0.1 14 0 9.7E+5 9.8E+5 0 1.9E+4 1.5E+4 1
TD.4.99 76 1.9 1572 26 9.6E+7 9.7E+7 7 1.9E+6 1.3E+6 1
TD.5.99 8930 119 MO 2028 9.1E+9 9.6E+9 446 1.8E+8 1.2E+8 1
CRAG.7.9 N/A N/A N/A 323 4.7E+6 5.3E+6 57 1.0E+6 5.9E+5 1
CRAG.8.9 N/A N/A N/A 3300 4.2E+7 4.8E+7 540 9.5E+6 5.3E+6 1
CRAG.9.9 N/A N/A N/A – 3.8E+8 4.3E+8 5022 4.3E+7 4.8E+7 1
LG(HC).4.30 N/A N/A N/A 26 6.5E+5 8.0E+5 6 1.4E+5 4.4E+4 24
LG(HC).5.30 N/A N/A N/A 778 1.7E+7 2.1E+7 257 4.1E+6 1.2E+5 240
LG(HC).6.30 N/A N/A N/A TO – – 13180 1.1E+8 3.2E+7 2160
Table 1: Results for Gamut and other games
For each instance, we have compared ConGa to the game solver Gambit [19] and to a
base solver called enum1 (Algorithm 1). This solver works like Gambit by examining
each tuple but the only difference is that it uses the compact Constraint Game repre-
sentation. All experiments have been executed on a 48-cores AMD Opteron 6174 with
4-processors at 2,2 GHz with 256 GB of RAM. In table 1, times are given in seconds
and the number aE+b is equal to a× 10b.
The experiment on Gambit is divided into two steps: we first generate the normal form
matrix (column NF gen) and then we launch the solver gambit-enumpure on the normal
form to find all PNE. We have measured the time needed to generate the normal form
(with a time-out of 9 000 seconds) and its size (in GB), then the time required for the
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game to be solved by Gambit (with a time-out of 20 000 seconds). TO stands for Time
Out, MO for Memory Out and ”–” means there is no information (for example, if the
generation times out, it is not possible to launch the resolution). As expected, the size of
the normal form soon becomes intractable and exceeds the capacity of Gambit, although
it can handle matrices of 2 GB.
For enum1 and ConGa, we have measured the time needed to solve an instance (with
also a time-out of 20 000 seconds), the number of candidate profiles and the number
of deviation checks performed when checking whether a candidate is a PNE. From a
simple reasoning, the number of candidate for enum1 is simply |DVc |, and the num-
ber of checks is comprised between the number of candidates and an upper bound of
|DVc | × |P|. Not surprisingly, we see that ConGa prunes most of the time a large part
of the search space, mainly thanks to NBR detection. But interestingly, most of the
time, it also saves deviation checks, meaning that the solution is found in the tables
before a check is performed. A notable counterexample is the Minimum Effort Game
with a domain of size 2 (MEG.30.2 and MEG.35.2) for which neither the tables or the
NBR detection are working because the domains are too small. Note that games with
hard constraints are not implementable in Gambit, indicated by N/A for not applicable.
In all other benchmarks, Conga outperforms both Gambit and enum1 by one order of
magnitude or even more.
A potential problem of Conga could be that the size of the tables grows too much. It is
easy to build an example for which the first player will get a table of exponential size:
the game with no constraint for each player. In this game each profile is a PNE and is
thus stored in the table of the first player. However, this behavior has not been observed
in practice in any of our examples. Tables rather stay of reasonable size, either because
they belong to lower level players and they are reset often or because many profiles do
not reach high level players.
7 Conclusion
Probably the most important feature of Constraint Games is that they provide a new
compact yet natural encoding to game models. In this paper, we propose the first com-
plete solver for constraint games based on a fast computation of Nash consistency and
pruning of Never Best Responses. We show that these techniques are yet able to out-
perform the existing state-of-the-art solver Gambit. But they also open directions for
further investigations on efficient algorithmic techniques to compute Nash equilibria.
Future work include the use of heuristics, graphical constraint games and other solution
concepts like Pareto equilibria.
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